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Abstract 
This paper develops a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model incorporating trade 
facilitation aspects. This paper’s contributions are twofold: theoretical and empirical. First, this 
paper attempts to model trade facilitation explicitly in a dynamic CGE model applied. On the 
empirical side, I estimate, not assume, the tariff equivalent of red tape and related procedures at 
sectoral level. I use the ad valorem tariff equivalents of time to import and to export that have been 
estimated in a companion paper and I take into account the cost of such a process. To do so, I modify 
the Exter model that is calibrated on the Egyptian social accounting matrix of 2000/2001. My main 
findings show that, when trade facilitation is modeled precisely, i.e. by taking into account its cost as 
well as the tariff equivalents of its aspects, the impact of such a process is reduced. Meanwhile, its 
impact remains higher than trade liberalization. Moreover, some sectors witness a significant 
expansion more than others, especially processed food, garments and high value added products.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ﻣﺺﺨﻠ  
ا ﺪﺴﺠﻳ لﺎﻌﻓ ﻲﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ مﺎﻋ نزاﻮﺗ جذﻮﻤﻨﻟ ًارﻮﻄﺗ ﺔﻗرﻮﻟا ﻩﺬه مﺪﻘﺗﺮﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ يرﺎﺠﺘﻟا عﺎﻄﻘﻟا ﻲﻓ تاﺮﻴﺴﻴﺘﻟا ﻪﺟو . ﺔﻗرﻮﻟا ﻦﻤﻀﺘﺗ و
ﻦﻴﻴﺴﻴﺋر ﻦﻴﻤﺴﻗ ﻲﻟإ ﻢﺴﻘﻨﺗ تﺎﻣﺎﻬﺳا :ﻲﺒﻳﺮﺠﺗ ﺮﺧأ و يﺮﻈﻧ ﻢﺴﻗ .ﻻوأ : عﺎﻄﻘﻟا ﻲﻓ تاﺮﻴﺴﻴﺘﻠﻟ ﺎﺟذﻮﻤﻧ غﻮﺼﺗ نأ ﺔﻗرﻮﻟا ﻩﺬه لوﺎﺤﺗ
يﺮﺼﻤﻟا دﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻪﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﻦﻜﻤﻳ لﺎﻌﻓ ﻲﻘﻴﺒﻄﺗ مﺎﻋ نزاﻮﺗ جذﻮﻤﻧ لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﺢﺿاو ﻞﻜﺸﺑ يرﺎﺠﺘﻟا. ﺔﻴﺒﻳﺮﺠﺘﻟا ﺔﻴﺣﺎﻨﻟا ﻦﻣ و :
داﺮﻴﺘﺳا و ﺮﻳﺪﺼﺗ تﺎﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻢﺘﺗ ﺔﻨﻴﻌﻣ ﺔﻴﻨﻣز ةﺮﺘﻓ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟا ﺐﺴﺣ رﺪﻘﺗ ﻲﺘﻟا ﺔﻔﻳﺮﻌﺘﻠﻟ ﺔﺌﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟا ﻢﻴﻘﻟا مﺪﺨﺘﺳا ﻲﻨﻧﺎﻓ . ﺎﻬﻤﻴﻴﻘﺗ ﻢﺗ ﺪﻗو
ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا ﻩﺬه ﺔﻔﻠﻜﺗ رﺎﺒﺘﻋﻻا ﻲﻓ تﺬﺧأ و ﺔﻗرﻮﻟا ﻩﺬﻬﻟ ﺔﺒﺣﺎﺼﻣ ﺔﻗرو ﻲﻓ.  ﻦﻜﻤﻳ يﺬﻟا و ﺮﺘﺴآا نﻮﺟ جذﻮﻤﻧ ﻞﻳﺪﻌﺘﺑ ﺖﻤﻗ ﻲﻨﻧﺈﻓ اﺬﻬﻟ و
 مﺎﻌﻟ ﺔﻳﺮﺼﻤﻟا ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا تﺎﺑﺎﺴﺤﻟا ﺔﻓﻮﻔﺼﻣ ﺐﺳﺎﻨﻳ ﻰﺘﺣ ﺎﻴﺠﻳرﺪﺗ ﻩﺮﻴﻴﻐﺗ2000/2001 . ﺎﻬﻟ ﺖﻠﺻﻮﺗ ﻲﺘﻟا ﺔﻴﺴﻴﺋﺮﻟا  ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا ﺮﻴﺸﺗ و
ﻟا ﻩﺬه ﺔﻔﻠﻜﺗ رﺎﺒﺘﻋﻻا ﻲﻓ ﺬﺧﺆﻳ نأ ﻲﻨﻌﻤﺑ ،ﺔﻳرﺎﺠﺘﻟا تاﺮﻴﺴﻴﺘﻠﻟ ﻖﻴﻗد جذﻮﻤﻧ غﺎﺼﻳ ﺎﻣﺪﻨﻋ ﻪﻧأ ﻲﻟإ نﺎﻓ ،ﺔﺌﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟا ﺔﻔﻳﺮﻌﺘﻟا و تاﺮﻴﺴﻴﺘ
ﺾﻔﺨﻨﻳ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا ﻩﺬه ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ. ةرﺎﺠﺘﻟا ﺮﻳﺮﺤﺗ ﺮﺛا ﻦﻣ ﻰﻠﻋأ لاﺰﻳ ﻻ ﺔﻳرﺎﺠﺘﻟا تاﺮﻴﺴﻴﺘﻟا ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ نﺈﻓ ،ﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺖﻗﻮﻟا ﻲﻓو . ،ﻚﻟذ ﻰﻠﻋ ةوﻼﻋو
ﻨﻤﻟاو ةﺰهﺎﺠﻟا ﺲﺑﻼﻤﻟاو ﺔﻌﻨﺼﻤﻟا ﺔﻴﺋاﺬﻐﻟا داﻮﻤﻟا ﺎﺻﻮﺼﺧو ،ﺎهﺮﻴﻏ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ اﺮﻴﺒآ ﺎﻌﺳﻮﺗ ﺪﻬﺸﺗ تﺎﻋﺎﻄﻘﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ نﺈﻓ تاذ تﺎﺠﺘ
ﺔﻌﻔﺗﺮﻤﻟا ﺔﻓﺎﻀﻤﻟا ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟا. 
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1. Introduction  
Improving the efficiency of trade logistics is a critical priority for trade promotion. Hence, relaxing 
the constraints “behind-the-border” that increase the cost of doing business would contribute much 
to a country’s integration into global trade. That is why trade facilitation has become a crucial aspect 
of trade policy. Currently, the real barriers to trade in many countries, and especially developing 
ones, are no longer tariﬀs or quotas, but other impediments such as high corruption, lengthier time to 
deliver or to clear traded goods, more complicated bureaucracy and poor infrastructure. This shows 
to what extent trade facilitation is considered one of the most important Doha Development Round’s 
issues that has to be promoted. The “Trade Facilitation” definition adopted here is the one defined in 
Zaki (2008). This definition splits trade facilitation aspects into four major parts: simplification of 
commercial procedures; harmonization of commercial rules; transparent information and procedures 
and the recourse to new technologies allowing trade promotion. In this paper, I only focus on the 
impact of bureaucracy, trade length on commerce and corruption. 
Three main motivations explain the importance of quantifying such a topic through a CGE model in 
the Egyptian context: economic interests, empirical reasons and more specifically the Egyptian case. 
First, reduction of the administrative barriers is likely to have more impact on trade than the 
reduction of classical ones as such impediments involve transaction length, bureaucracy, customs 
fraud, etc. In other terms, they do not have any receipts like tariﬀs or quotas. Second, with the 
increased supply chains interdependency, imported products delivery delays have turned into a 
severe constraint on production. This is why customs clearance and delivery of imported products 
have become quite an important determinant of the production process. Third, the cost of non-
facilitation is very high: it accounts for 2 to 15% of the exchanged goods value.  
As to the Egyptian case, in 2008, Egypt has been the top reformer in the region and worldwide as it 
greatly improved its position in the global rankings on the ease of doing business. Yet, it is still 
ranked 26
th 
for Trading Across Borders (Doing Business, 2008) but it is much better than many other 
comparable economies such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan or Syria. In addition, the World Economic 
Forum issued its first “Global Enabling Trade Report” in which Egypt ranks a low 87
th 
for the ease of 
getting goods across the border. The report underlined the positive as well as the negative aspects of 
Egypt’s trade facilitation aspects. On the one hand, it has a fairly well developed transport in-
frastructure, including the associated services, good maritime connectivity thanks to Suez Canal and 
the related services and a relatively good quality of roads. Despite the fact that importing goods is 
neither costly nor time consuming, importers raise concerns about the eﬃciency of customs and 
other border agencies. In particular, the number of days and documents to export or to import still 
hinder the Egyptian trade. Hence, from a policymaking point of view, eliminating such barriers 
would have a highly significant eﬀect on Egypt’s trade and welfare.  
Finally, trade facilitation has not been studied much in a robust empirical way. The most common 
tools used to estimate the eﬀect of such a process are: gravity models (Wilson et al, 2003 and 2004; 
Zaki, 2009)1 or CGEs. Yet, the empirical literature of CGE on trade facilitation measures has had so 
far three common limitations. First, trade facilitation has never been explicitly modeled in CGE 
models. More specifically, the shock introduced did not incorporate properly trade facilitation 
aspects. For instance, the shock induced by trade facilitation is associated with technical progress in 
transport sector or an increase in its productivity (Hertel et al. 2001; Fox et al, 2003 and Decreux and 
Fontagn´e 2009). For instance, Fox et al, (2003) have shown that removal of such barriers would 
benefit the Mexican economy by U.S.$1.8 billion per year, while the U.S. economy would see a 
welfare increase of about U.S.$1.4 billion per year. Another technique is the decrease in exports or 
imports charges which is reflected in a decrease of the export or import prices. Moreover, several 
studies neglected some trade facilitation aspects, such as Minor and Tsigas (2008) who assessed the 
impact of time reduction2 without taking into account other aspects like the number of documents, 
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the Internet, the corruption or the geographic aspects. This point should underestimate the trade 
facilitation benefits as the latter is primarily based on a paperless world. Moreover, 
Finally, trade facilitation has not been studied much in a robust empirical way. The most common 
tools used to estimate the eﬀect of such a process are: gravity models (Wilson et al, 2003 and 2004; 
Zaki, 2009)1 or CGEs. Yet, the empirical literature of CGE on trade facilitation measures has had so 
far three common limitations. First, trade facilitation has never been explicitly modeled in CGE 
models. More specifically, the shock introduced did not incorporate properly trade facilitation 
aspects. For instance, the shock induced by trade facilitation is associated with technical progress in 
transport sector or an increase in its productivity (Hertel et al. 2001; Fox et al, 2003 and Decreux and 
Fontagn´e 2009). For instance, Fox et al, (2003) have shown that removal of such barriers would 
benefit the Mexican economy by U.S.$1.8 billion per year, while the U.S. economy would see a 
welfare increase of about U.S.$1.4 billion per year. Another technique is the decrease in exports or 
imports charges which is reflected in a decrease of the export or import prices. Moreover, several 
studies neglected some trade facilitation aspects, such as Minor and Tsigas (2008) who assessed the 
impact of time reduction2 without taking into account other aspects like the number of documents, 
the Internet, the corruption or the geographic aspects. This point should underestimate the trade 
facilitation benefits as the latter is primarily based on a paperless world. Moreover, Decreux and 
Fontagn´e (2009) have used the same data in Mirage model that was modified in order to incorporate 
trade costs that add up to ordinary freight costs. Their simulation experiment consisted of dividing 
by two the processing time exceeding the median level. They have shown that trade facilitation 
would add each year some US$99 billion gains to the world GDP in the long run. Finally, to our best 
knowledge, the empirical literature has shed light on the gains of such a process without taking into 
account its costs. Yet, the disagreement between developed and developing countries on this cost is 
still raised on the Doha Development Agenda and complicates its conclusion. Hence, neglecting the 
cost may be misleading as it overestimates the gains coming from eliminating administrative 
barriers. This is why in this paper, I try to assess simultaneously the gains as well as the costs 
induced by trade facilitation. 
Therefore, this paper’s contributions are threefold. First, it analyzes trade facilitation eﬀects in an 
explicit and theoretical way. Furthermore, in order to have consistent estimates of administrative 
barriers, ad valorem equivalents of time to export and to import have been estimated from a 
theoretical gravity model (Zaki, 2009) and introduced in the CGE model. The particularity of those 
estimates is that they take into account many aspects of red tape costs simultaneously, i.e. time, 
document, corruption, Internet and geographic aspects3. Finally, a very simple way of costs 
modeling is proposed in order to avoid an overvaluation of the trade facilitation benefits.  
In this paper, I modify a dynamic CGE model to assess the impact of trade facilitation through an 
empirical evidence from Egypt. The“Exter” model is adjusted to the Egyptian economy and 
modified to take into account the trade facilitation aspects. It has been calibrated using the Egyptian 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of 2000/2001. Two main scenarios are simulated. The first one 
presents the eﬀect of the classical trade liberalization by lowering tariﬀs. The second scenario 
involves two simulations: the first shock is very ambitious as it reduces the tariﬀ equivalents of time 
to export and to import to reach the level of the best practice, namely the USA. The second 
simulation adds the cost of trade facilitation to the previous simulation. To do so, an increase in 
                                                          
1 For a detailed literature review of gravity models used to estimate the eﬀect of trade facilitation, see Zaki (2009).  
2 Minor and Tsigas (2008) measure the cost of time through the preference for air transport towards sea transport.  
3 For further details on the way those ad valorem equivalents have been estimated, see Zaki (2009). In this paper, 
estimation is done in two steps. First, time to export and to import are regressed on their determinants, namely number of 
documents to export and to import, the Internet widespread, geographic variables (begin landlocked or an island and 
other institutional variables). In a second step, once time to export and to import are estimated, their predicted values are 
introduced in the gravity model and finally ad valorem equivalents are computed from this model  
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public wages and public expenditure on transport and communication are simulated. The rationale 
behind this is as follows: on the one hand, increasing wages reduces bribes, customs fraud and therefore 
facilitates trade. On the other hand, if the government increases its expenditure on transport sector, 
transport infrastructure becomes more eﬃcient and boosts trade.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes trade facilitation in the Egyptian case. Section 
3 presents a brief review of the empirical literature of CGE models on trade facilitation. Section 4 
develops theoretical foundations of the model. Section 5 is devoted to data analysis. Section 6 
discusses the simulations results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Trade Facilitation Landscape: Some Stylized Facts 
2.1. The Egyptian Case 
Egypt’s situation of trade facilitation has highly improved during last years. In 2008, Egypt has been 
the top reformer in the region and worldwide as it greatly improved its position in the global 
rankings on the ease of doing business. Egypt reduced the minimum capital required to start a 
business, from L.E. 50,000 to just L.E. 1,000 and halved the time and cost of start-up. It cut down 
fees for registering property from 3% of the property value to a low and fixed amount. Moreover, it 
eased the bureaucracy that builders face in getting construction permits. Meanwhile, regarding trade 
procedures, it launched new one-stop shops for traders at Egyptian ports, and it reduced the time to 
import by only seven days and the time to export by only five. Despite all these reforms, red tape 
barriers still hinder trade in Egypt. Table 1 exhibits to what extent red tape procedures for exports 
and imports remain high and are costly in Egypt. In 2007, the former required 20 days costing U.S.$ 
1,014 and the latter 25 days adding some U.S.$ 1,049 to the value of imported goods. Consequently, 
Egypt still has a long way to reach better rankings in the ease of doing business or best practice 
countries in trade facilitation aspects. 
Table 2 compares the numerous documents requested for exports and imports for Egypt in 2007. 
Obviously, these documents increase transaction length as they have to be completed before customs 
clearance or the delivery of imported goods. However, if these documents become computerized in a 
single window, time to export and to import would be highly reduced. Simultaneously, corruption of 
customs agents and the errors of typing customs data would significantly decrease. Recall that one of 
the most important objectives of the “Trade Facilitation” initiatives is twofold: making international 
trade easier through a paperless world  
Figure 1 shows that Egypt’s situation in trade facilitation has improved: between 2006 and 2009, 
number of documents to be filed for exports decreased from 8 to 6 documents and from 8 to 6 for 
imports. The same pattern is observed for time as number of days for exports has fallen from 27 to 
15 and from 29 to 18 for imports. This high enhancement for Egypt’s situation is reflected in the 
export and import costs. The former went down from U.S.$1,014 to U.S.$714 and the latter from 
U.S.$ 1,049 to U.S.$729. Consequently, Egypt’s position in the ease of doing business increased 
from the 86th to the 21st . According to the Trade Policy Review (WTO, 2005), the Customs 
Administration has stepped up eﬀorts to improve inspection and clearance activities. Thus, advanced 
clearance centers have been established at the ports of Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, and Suez to 
simplify entry procedures. Those centers (in Egypt, there are six main customs oﬃces: Alexandria -
Al Mahmodeia (6,266 staﬀ), Cairo (4,194), Damietta (350), Port Said (2,949), Sinai (581), and Suez 
(1,100)) are endowed with computers and x-ray equipment to improve eﬃciency. However, Egypt’s 
situation has deteriorated between 2008 and 2009 as it became the 24th and both the cost to export 
and to import have increased to reach U.S.$737 and U.S.$823 respectively. 
As for Egypt’s eﬀorts to liberalize and facilitate trade, the following initiatives could be cited. In 
1998, Egypt reduced, unilaterally, the maximum tariﬀ rate on most products from 50% to 40% and 
consolidated rates of 35 to 45% to 30%. Moreover, in 1998 the Government amended the 1964 law 
establishing the General Egyptian Maritime Organization to permit the private sector to carry out 
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most maritime transport services. This measure ended the Government’s long-standing monopoly in 
this sector and increased the eﬃciency of transport services. Egypt has also passed a law permitting 
private firms to build and operate new airports. 
Yet, the picture in Egypt is not that optimistic. According to the Enabling Trade Index issued by the 
World Economic Forum (2008), Egypt has been ranked a low 87th amongst 118 countries for the 
ease of getting goods across the border. On the one hand, Egypt has a fairly well developed transport 
infrastructure, including the associated services, good maritime connectivity and the related services 
and a relatively good quality of roads. Despite the fact that importing goods is neither costly nor time 
consuming, importers raise concerns about the eﬃciency of customs and other border agencies 
pointing out that bureaucracy and transaction length are significant impediments to trade. Its score 
was 3.51 (the first country is Hong Kong with a score of 6.04 and the last is Chad with some 2.6). 
This index determines the aspects that enable trade, and breaks the enablers into four overall issue 
areas, or subindexes: (1) market access, (2) border administration, (3) transport and communications 
infrastructure, and (4) the business environment4. It is worth noting that border administration 
indices show that Egypt is not well positioned neither for eﬃciency of customs administration 
(ranked 84th) nor for transparency of border administration (71th). Eﬃciency of exports and imports 
is located in a middle position (49th). 
2.2. Egypt’s Position vis-`a-vis Other Countries 
Figure 2 shows that Egypt’s performance is much better that many other comparator economies such 
as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan or Syria. According to the Doing Business Report (2009), the only two 
MENA countries that are better than Egypt are Israel (9th) and United Arab Emirates (14th) while 
Egypt is the 24th . Singapore is the top ranked economy followed by Denmark, Hong Kong, China 
and Norway. 
Table 3 presents Egypt’s position vis-`a-vis other countries concerning the time, documents and cost 
of exports and imports. It is found that Egypt has a performance slightly higher than the average of 
the region. Having a quick glance to other countries of the region, it is note worthy that many 
disparities could be observed. For instance, Saudi Arabia sped up trade, reduced the number of 
documents required for importing and cut the time needed for handling at ports and terminals by two 
days for both imports and exports. In contrast, in Algeria, the costs associated with exporting are 
about 80% higher than world averages, due to excessive costs of customs clearance and technical 
control. In Syria, although costs are higher than average, the greatest impediment to exporting is the 
time required for export clearing processes (almost two thirds higher than the world average). 
Finally, several countries (e.g. Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Oman) maintain particularly taxing 
export policies in terms of time and cost.  
To put it in a nutshell, Egypt has highly improved its situation in decreasing red tape costs impeding 
trade comparatively to similar countries of the region. However, such impediments remain 
significant barriers to trade as they are resource wasting, time consuming and, theoretically do not 
have any revenues. However, in the Egyptian case and certainly in many other developing countries, 
such red tape barriers may generate some revenues for the customs agents who receive bribes to 
accelerate the delivery of imported or exported goods. From a policymaking standpoint, this has two 
implications. On the one hand, governments should increase the customs agents wages to reduce the 
incentive of such agents to accept bribes, and on the other, they should implement computerized 
                                                          
4 To calculate these subindexes, 10 aspects have been taken into account as follows: 1. Tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers; 2. 
Proclivity to trade; 3. Eﬃciency of customs administration; 4. Eﬃciency of import-export procedures 5. Transparency of 
border administration; 6. Availability and quality of transport infrastructure; 7. Availability and quality of transport 
services; 8. Availability and use of ICTs; 9. Regulatory environment; 10. Physical security.  
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agencies to handle eﬃciently the exchanged goods and to avoid artificial delays as well as 
supplementary amounts paid by the traders to the customs agents. 
3. Methodology 
This paper uses a dynamic CGE model adapted to the Egyptian economy and modified to take into 
account trade facilitation aspects. Three main factors explain the relevance of using a CGE model to 
assess the impact of such a process. First, CGE models are an application of the neoclassical theory, 
considered in its international trade dimension, and of the classical trade theory. For several years, 
they have been constituting a major tool to assess the impact of economic policies in a general 
equilibrium framework. Hence, they take into account the numerous economic interactions between 
diﬀerent sectors, markets and agents within the same economy. Multinational CGE models assess 
the impact of an economic policy taking place in a certain country on other countries. This shows to 
what extent such a tool is a quite important tool to evaluate the impact of trade policies, which is the 
case of this paper. Second, CGE models represent a quite satisfying tool in modeling especially for 
developing countries. This is due to the fact that the latter suﬀer from several problems regarding 
statistical data such as lacking ones, unreliable sources or inconsistent long time series, etc. By 
contrast, as CGE models use only the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), they do not need a lot of 
data, that is why they can be used in developing countries. Finally, trade facilitation, as well as trade 
liberalization, should be studied in a CGE framework as its elimination has many eﬀects not only on 
Egypt’s trade, but also on sectors expansion or contraction, employment, investment, consumption 
and thus welfare. All these eﬀects could not be studied in a partial equilibrium framework. That is 
why in order to determine the trade facilitation impact on the Egyptian economy, it is appropriate to 
use a CGE model. Exter model is used and adapted to be more suitable to the Egyptian economy in 
order to assess the impact of trade facilitation. 
3.1. The Model Assumptions 
I have used the Exter model along with its more updated versions (Annabi et al. 2004; Fofana et al. 
2006) and the Pep1-1 model (Decaluw´e et al. 2009). Exter model was originally constructed by 
Decaluw´e et al. (2001) to assess the impact of diﬀerent economic policies on developing countries. 
This model presents a small open economy. Clearly, such an assumption is consistent with the 
Egyptian economy as it has no influence on the world prices (price taker). It is a real model where 
the currency is only an instrument of exchange and a unit of account. Therefore, the currency 
remains neutral, meaning that price changes aﬀect only the decisions of production and 
consumption. All prices are normalized in the benchmark scenario. 
Moving to the production factors, the model has a perfect competition framework, therefore the 
profit maximization condition implies that the price of production factors is equal to its marginal 
productivity. Labor is perfectly mobile between production sectors, while capital is specific to each 
one of them. The production factors are internationally immobile. Hence, factor endowments are not 
aﬀected by resources transfers from or to the Rest of the World. 
Furthermore, the existence of foreign savings has no impact on the volume of productive capital. 
Industries use not only production factors but also intermediate products from other activities. 
Households allocate their revenues between consumption and savings and firms allocate them 
between investment and savings. Reflecting the nature of the classical framework, competition and 
resource allocation are adjusted through the flexible movement of prices. Finally, it is a sequential 
dynamic model5. This means that households have a myopic behavior. 
                                                          
5Another type of dynamic models could be identified which is the inter-temporal one. This type of models is based on 
optimal growth theory where the behavior of economic agents is characterized by perfect foresight. Households know all 
about future changes in prices and they maximize their inter-temporal utility function under a wealth constraints to 
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3.2. The Model Structure 
This CGE model has some common features with other CGE models as follows. Production factors 
(labor and capital) are imperfect substitutes in the value added following a Constant Elasticity 
Substitution (CES) function (with constant returns to scale). A perfect complementarity (`a la 
Leontieﬀ, i.e. technical substitution elasticity is zero) exists between, on the one hand, intermediate 
inputs and, on the other between intermediate inputs and production factors or value added. 
Households maximize their utility function represented by a linear expenditure system of preferences 
(LES)6 subject to their income constraint. Thus, there is a minimal level of some good that has to be 
consumed irrespective of its price or the consumer’s income. Moreover, expenditure on the ith 
commodity consists of expenditure on the minimum required quantity for that commodity plus the 
proportion of the budget which is left over after paying for all minimum requirements. This 
proportion is the marginal budget share that determines the allocation of supernumerary income. 
Domestic production is distributed between domestic consumption and foreign exports through a 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Imports are diﬀerentiated by origin following 
an Armington-function. The latter is combined with domestic production through a CES function to 
satisfy domestic demand. Firms have revenues coming from capital remuneration and transfers. 
Their expenditures are divided between investment cost and transfers to households. Households and 
firms pay taxes to government. Moreover, many transfers are made among economic agents, i.e. 
households, firms, government and the rest of the world. 
As mentioned before, the dynamic model is recursive (sequential) which means that this model is 
based on a series of static CGE models that are linked between periods by exogenous and 
endogenous variables updating procedure. Hence, the model is solved sequentially over time. In 
dynamic models, the economy grows even without a policy shock, which is called “Business As 
Usual” (BAU). The latter is generated under the following assumptions: public wages, public 
employment and public expenditures increase with an exogenous growth rate. Total factor 
productivity by activity is taken into account. Population, minimum consumption, as well as 
transfers to and from households are all updated exogenously. Capital stock is updated endogenously 
on the basis of previous investment and depreciation. A quadratic investment function is adopted as 
follows: 
       (1) 
 
where KDj,t is the capital demand by sector j, Indj,t investment by destination, γ1j and γ2j parameters 
of the investment demand equation, Ut capital user cost, r j,t capital return in sector j and savadjt 
adjustment variable for investment and savings. 
The volume of total investment ITVOLt is equal to the gross fixed capital formation ITt divided by 
the investment price index Pinvt 
ITVOLt    =     ITt  
                    Pinvt           (2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
determine their consumption over the time horizon. Regarding firms, they determine their investment decisions through a 
cash flow maximization over the same horizon.  
6 This function is theoretically consistent as it permits imposing some general restrictions of the classical demand theory 
which are: adding-up (value of total demands equals total expenditure); homogeneity (demands are homogenous of 
degree zero in total expenditure and prices); symmetry (cross-price derivatives of the Hicksian demands are symmetric); 
and negativity (direct substitution eﬀects are negative for the Hicksian demands). 
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Capital in t +1 depends on the capital volume in t depreciated by δ to which investment in t is added. 
        (3) 
 
Capital user cost Ut equals to the sum of the real interest rate ir and the depreciation one δ multiplied 
by the investment price index 
Ut = Pinvt (ir + δ)            (4) 
Finally, macroeconomic closure is an important determinant of the CGE model results. These 
constraints have to be satisfied by the economic system, but are not considered in the decisions of 
any microeconomic agent. Normally, they are determined according to what fits the economy. 
Installed capital is sector-specific, so that the rental rate of capital varies across sectors. The 
exchange rate index is the num´eraire. Direct and indirect tax rates are constant. The share of current 
account to GDP is fixed exogenously. For each household, savings are a fixed share of its disposable 
income. Firms’ savings are also determined by the model. Therefore, the model is savings driven. 
3.3. Incorporating Trade Facilitation in the Model 
In order to capture the explicit eﬀect of trade facilitation, the administrative barri¬ers have been 
introduced as a tariﬀ imposed on the world prices. Hence, ad valorem equivalents have been 
calculated for such barriers as will be shown later. 
On the import side, domestic import prices Pmj,t will be higher than world prices P wmj,t (in foreign 
currency) due to tariﬀ barriers tmj and the ad valorem equivalent of the time to import tfmj as 
follows: 
Pmj,t = et P wmj,t (1 + tmj + tfmj)(1 + txj)        (5) 
where et is the nominal exchange rate and txj is indirect taxes rate on sector j products.  
Recall that those ad valorem equivalents of the time to import and to export include many trade 
facilitation aspects, namely bureaucracy, the Internet widespread, corruption and geographical 
impediments. 
As usual, receipts coming from tariﬀs and indirect taxes are captured by the government. By 
contrast, the total revenues originating from the administrative barriers TFMj,t to trade are not 
captured by the government. This is why a domestic agent called “Inefficiency” has been created and 
its revenues Y Hinef,t are the sum of the time receipts on imported goods as follows: 
T F Mj,t  = t f mj  Pwmj,t et Mj,t           (6) 
Y Hinef,t  =∑16
j
T F Mj,t          (7) 
where Mj,t is the import demand of product j. 
Theoretically, this revenue is a deadweight loss as it is notperceived neither by the Government, nor 
by firms, nor by households. Yet, in the real world, part of such revenues is presumably captured by 
customs agents and public servants who work for the border agencies in order to simplify the 
commercial procedures, obtain requested signatures and speed up the delivery time. Once this agent 
will perceive non-eﬃcient revenues, he will spend them on his consumption Ci,inef,t that follows a 
Cobb-Douglas function diﬀerently to other agents who have a LES function. Such a diﬀerence is 
explained by the fact that this agent does not necessarily need a minimal level of consumption like 
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other households. Hence, once his revenues are cut to a zero level, his consumption also is vanished 
as follows: 
Ci,inef,t = γi,inef Y Hinef,t  / P ci,t          (8) 
where γi,inef is the budgetary share of good i in the ineﬃciency agent income and Pci,t is the 
composite price of good i. 
On the export side, export taxes tej and tariﬀ equivalent of the time to export tfxj increase the Fob 
prices of exported goods P fobj,t. Hence, the producer price of the exported good Pej,t is given by: 
         (9) 
 
Similarly, the total revenues coming from the time to export TFXj,t are computed as follows: 
TFXj,t = t f xj Pej,t EXj,t                     (10) 
where EXj,t is the export supply of product j. 
Those revenues are associated to flows going out of the local market and are not absorbed by 
domestic agents. Hence, they cannot be treated in the same way as the receipts coming from the time 
to import, that is why I consider them as transfers going to the rest of the world. In other terms, they 
are captured by an external ineﬃciency agent or the foreign customs agents. 
Hence, introducing explicitly this agent in the economic cycle shows to what extent those barriers 
are a loss in the economy as they are not perceived explicitly by neither the government, nor the 
firms, nor the households and therefore can be isolated from the rest of the economy. Therefore the 
welfare of the nation is not aﬀected by the welfare of the “ineﬃciency agent”. 
This model is run using GAMS7. Hence, 16 sectors and 20 periods are taken account, which yields 
17601 endogenous variables determined by 17601 equations and 799 exogenous variables. 
4. Data 
4.1. The Matrix Structure 
The model presented above is calibrated on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Egypt 
2000/2001. This matrix was built by the National Institute of Planning attached to the Ministry of 
Planning. The matrix consists of six major accounts: production factors, economic agents, industries, 
composite products, capital and finally taxes. It incorporates two production factors: labor and 
capital, six economic agents: households (rural and urban), companies (private and public), 
government and the rest of the world. 
The SAM includes 17 sectors structured as follows: two agricultural ones (crop production and 
animal production), eleven industries (oil and mining, tobacco, food industries, spinning and 
weaving , clothing (including leather), chemical industries, non-metal industries, industries of basic 
metals, metal industries, machinery and equipment and other industries) and finally four services 
sectors (construction and electricity, communication and transport, other productive services and 
social services). The composite products account includes the same sectors mentioned above. The 
capital account shows the investment demand by sector. Finally, the last account is the taxes one that 
comprises: direct taxes, indirect taxes, subsidies and tariﬀs on imports. 
                                                          
7 The model's notation and mathematical formulation are available upon request 
Pej,t =        et P fobj,t 
             (1+ tej = t f xj)  
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For the sake of simplicity and modeling consideration, four changes have been made in the structure 
of the matrix as follows. First, private and public firms have been merged into a single account 
including entitled firms. Second, indirect taxes have been added to subsidies considering the latter as 
negative taxes. Then, the construction and electricity sectors have been merged with the one of other 
productive services in order to facilitate the model resolution in GAMS and to avoid zero values in 
the cells. Finally, the taxes account was introduced in the government revenues. 
A very brief analysis of the Egyptian economy through the matrix flows shows that the latter is 
characterized by several key aspects, namely: a significant taxation, an important productive services 
sector (contributing by some 50% to the Egyptian growth), a high rate of imports, and high exports 
of services thanks to Suez canal and tourism receipts. To these two main sources of foreign currency 
in Egypt, a third source, being transfers from Egyptian workers abroad, is added. 
4.2. Calibration and Other Sources of the Data 
Along with the SAM of 2000/2001, some other sources of data for investment by destination, key 
parameters, tariﬀs and trade facilitation have been used.  
First, the national accounts coming from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) reports (2001) have been used to determine the implemented investment by destination. 
In the Egyptian matrix, we have only the sum of indirect taxes and import duties imposed on 
composite commodities without disaggregating them. That is why, in the calibration, I have used the 
applied tariﬀs coming from the World Trade Organization and “Trade and Production” database in 
order to calculate the import duties for each sector8. Then, tariﬀs revenues are deduced from the total 
revenues to obtain the indirect taxes receipts which have been used to calibrate the sales tax rate. 
Some other parameters have been taken from previous studies. First, the nominal interest rate 
(11.5%) has been taken from the Central Bank of Egypt database. In addition, the population growth 
rate (1.8%) has been acquired from the CAPMAS data. Growth rates for total factor productivity, 
transfers, public wages and employment have been taken from the World Bank and the CAPMAS 
datasets. Last but not least, according to Miketa (2005), I adopt the depreciation rate that is equal to 
4%. I follow Rutherford et al. (1993) in selecting the benchmark elasticities. Labor-capital 
substitution varies across sectors, ranging from 0.43 to 1.99. Trade elasticities are taken from Konan 
and Maskus (1997). The substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods (both 
intermediates and consumption) is set at 2.0. The transformation elasticity between domestic and 
exported output is set to 5.0. 
Finally, for trade facilitation, ad valorem equivalents of time to export and to import have been 
estimated using my gravity model (Zaki, 2009) as will be shown later in order to introduce them in 
the CGE model. 
5. Estimating Tariﬀ Equivalents for Administrative Barriers 
In order to better evaluate the impact of trade facilitation, tariﬀ equivalent for administrative barriers 
to trade should be calculated. To do so, I follow the methodology adopted by Olarreaga, Nicita and 
Kee (2009) where they estimate ad-valorem tariﬀ equivalent for non-tariﬀ barriers based on a gravity 
model. Similarly, I rely on a gravity model (Zaki, 2009) that determines the impact of trade 
facilitation on bilateral trade in two steps. First, time to export and to import are regressed on their 
determinants, namely number of documents to export and to import, the Internet widespread, 
corruption, geographic variables (being landlocked or an island and other institutional variables). In 
a second step, once time to export and to import is estimated, their predicted values are introduced in 
the gravity model. The rationale behind this is to take into account the part of transaction time that is 
                                                          
8 This was done by multiplying the tariﬀ rate by the value of imports given in the matrix. 
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only explained by trade facilitation aspects. Lastly, the gravity outcome is used to compute ad 
valorem equivalents for these two variables. 
As Olarreaga et al. (2009) argue, to make trade facilitation aspects comparable with ad valorem 
equivalents, the quantity impact should be transformed into price equivalents. This yields the ad 
valorem equivalent of one day to export and to import. To determine the AVE specific to each 
country, the AVE of one day is multiplied by the number of days to export and to import available in 
“Doing Business” dataset. Recall that those tariﬀ equivalents take into account other administrative 
barriers such as number of documents, the Internet widespread, corruption, as well as the geographic 
impediments to trade. Hence, they could be perceived as more exhaustive AVE of “trade 
facilitation”. I have calculated the AVE at the ISIC 3-digits level for 138 countries9 . Table 4 
displays the aggregated tariﬀ equivalents for Egypt. 
It is quite obvious that some sectors have higher ad valorem tariﬀs than others. For instance, food 
and beverages (which are perishable goods), garments and textiles (seasonal goods), machines (used 
as inputs in the production process) and professional and scientific equipment (high value added 
products) are characterized by higher AVE than others such as wood products or footwear. Those 
tariﬀs have been introduced in the CGE model with some assumptions. First, as the data that have 
been used to estimate tariﬀ equivalents is “Trade and Production” (2004), only manufacturing 
sectors are included in this dataset, consequently, AVE have been estimated only for manufacturing 
sector. Yet, the Egyptian SAM encloses two agricultural sectors (animal and vegetable) and three 
service sectors. For agricultural sectors, I have applied the same tariﬀ equivalents obtained for food 
sector as they share many common characteristics with agricultural ones (mainly, both of them being 
perishable products). As to services, social services have zero tariﬀ equivalent for time as they are 
not tradeable. Finally, I have used the same tariﬀ equivalent of the machinery sector as for the 
transport one as the latter deals with machines and infrastruc-ture issues. Clearly, it would be much 
more interesting if AVEs of trade facilitation are estimated separately for agriculture and service 
sector, but for data consideration, it was diﬃcult to do it. Computing AVE for agriculture and 
services is on my research agenda once data availability allows it. 
6. Simulations Results 
The core of my analysis is structured around a set of scenarios meant to illustrate the implications of 
alternative approaches to trade liberalization and facilitation. Hence, I perform three simulations 
through two main scenarios. The first scenario assesses the impact of trade facilitation. It involves 
two simulations: the first one assesses the impact of trade facilitation by shocking the ad valorem 
tariﬀ equivalent of time to import and to export. This simulation (TF) reduces the tariﬀ equivalents 
to reach the level of the best practise, namely the United States (whose AVE is 1%). The second 
simulation (TFCOST) adds the cost of trade facilitation to the previous simulation. To do so, an 
increase of the public expenditure on transport and communication (to assess the eﬀect of more 
eﬃcient transport infrastructure) is simulated along with an increase of public wages (to reduce 
corruption). The second scenario determines the impact of trade liberalization (TL). Thus, an 
unconditional trade liberalization is adopted assuming that Egypt extends 90 percent tariﬀ reductions 
to all countries. Clearly, it is a very optimistic scenario but it is simulated for the sake of comparison 
between trade liberalization and facilitation eﬀects. The following table summarizes those simulation 
experiments. 
                                                          
9 All ad valorem tariﬀ equivalent for the whole sample are available upon request 
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Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
In the following section, I will begin with a static analysis of the trade facilitation eﬀects in order to 
take into account all the sectoral and the microeconomic aspects of such a process. For the sake of 
simplicity and comparison, I will present only the results of trade liberalization (TL) and trade 
facilitation (TF). Later, I will proceed to a dynamic analysis assessing the long term eﬀects of trade 
facilitation. 
6.1. A Static Analysis of the Trade Facilitation Eﬀects 
6.1.1. Trade Facilitation: A Positive Sum Game for the Economy 
This section objective is to compare the static eﬀects of the trade facilitation (TF) and trade 
liberalization (TL). Eliminating red tape costs (cutting the ad valorem equivalents of time to export 
and to import to reach the level of the best practice) in Egypt yields high positive eﬀects for the 
whole economy. On the external level, when trade is facilitated, total exports and total imports are 
boosted by 5.8% and 5% respectively. Meanwhile, eliminating tariﬀ barriers in Egypt increases 
exports only by 1.4% and imports by 11%. It worth mentioning that the eﬀect of trade liberalization 
on imports is higher than that of trade facilitation because Egypt’s applied tariﬀs are higher: when 
they are eliminated, imports are boosted significantly. By contrast, trade facilitation yields high 
eﬀects on exports. 
Having a quick glance at the household behavior, it is worth noting that TF produces high gains for 
the following reasons. Removing red tape barriers increases households real revenues by 1.94%, 
decreases prices by 2.06% boosting the total consumption of urban and rural households by 1.8% 
and 2% respectively. The government revenues raise by 0.04% as there are no tariﬀ receipts that 
disappear once trade is facilitated. Firms revenues decline by 0.3% due to a 1.9% decrease in capital 
remuneration. 
Combining all these eﬀects, it is worth noting that trade facilitation boosts rural welfare10 by 1.8% 
and urban welfare by 1.6%. Clearly, such high positive results could be explained by several 
reasons: first, lower prices, higher revenues, no government loss in TF which allows the government 
to redistribute revenues in the economy and finally more imports and exports. Table 5 illustrates 
those patterns. 
This big diﬀerence between trade facilitation and trade liberalization is similar to what Eby Konan 
and Maskus (1996) have found. They have shown that, in Egypt’s integration with E.U., trade 
diversion eﬀects would outweigh trade creation ones worsening welfare by some 0.2%. Yet, 
reduction in administrative costs should increase the Egyptian welfare. 
In a similar paper, Hoekman and Konan (1999) assessed the impact of a deep integration between 
Egypt and the E.U. They showed that a shallow agreement (elimination of Egyptian tariﬀs or simply 
TL) with the E.U. would lead to a welfare decline. Meanwhile, if deep integration eﬀorts are pursued 
by eliminating regulatory barriers and red tape costs (TF), welfare gains may increase significantly. 
This is why, in this model, when trade is liberalized and facilitated simultaneously, welfare doubles 
going up from 2.3% to 4.3%. 
                                                          
10Welfare is computed as a percentage of the household's disposable income on the basis of the equivalent variation. 
Notation  Scenario Definition  Shocked Parameter  
BAU  Business As Usual scenario  No shock  
TL  An unconditional full trade liberalization tmi ↓ by 90%  
TF  Reducing the AVE of time to exp. and to imp. to the best practise  tfmi and tfxi ↓ by 90%  
TF+COST  Adding to TF the cost of Trade Facilitation  tfmj = tfxj ↓ by 90%  
  and GSERT RA ↑ by30% and wG ↑ 
by10%  
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6.1.2. Expanding Sectors 
Removing administrative barriers does not aﬀect all the sectors in the same way. The trade 
facilitation literature has evidenced that seasonal products such as garments, perishable ones like 
processed food and high value added goods (either equipments that are necessary for the production 
process or high technology ones with short market lifetime) are highly sensitive to transaction time 
and bureaucracy. When such barriers are eliminated, export prices increase, exporters are 
encouraged to boost their exports and hence increase their production. In the mean time, Figure 3a 
shows that sectoral exports rise, especially for agricultural products (vegetable and animal ones), 
processed foods, textiles, chemical industries, machinery equipments and transport services11. Such 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that long delays to cross borders impede the export 
diversification of developing countries. This is similar to the results obtained by Minor et al. (2008) 
who have shown that the reduction in the time to trade across borders results in increased shares of 
light, medium and heavy manufactures of between 7 and 26% in total exports. Finally, for exports as 
well as for export prices, trade facilitation impact is higher than trade liberalization is for almost all 
the sectors. 
Figure 3b illustrates the impact on imports. Import prices decrease as trade transactions become 
quicker. Thus, Egyptian consumers find imported goods cheaper and increase their consumption. As 
mentioned above, when trade is facilitated, imports of some sectors expand more than others 
especially processed food (7.4%), and agricultural products (7.6%). Such a point is quite important 
for Egypt as these sectors represent 8.6% and 15% respectively of total imports. Generally, trade 
facilitation has also a lower eﬀect than trade liberalization as tariﬀs are higher than the AVEs of the 
administrative barriers. Interestingly, tobacco which is highly protected in Egypt is not aﬀected by 
trade facilitation as it is not sensitive to time. 
Combining those patterns of exports and imports, once trade is facilitated, exporting sectors increase 
relatively their production with respect to importing ones. Increasing production means more 
demand of production factors. With constant capital (as capital is specific to each sector), sectors 
which are highly intensive in capital will demand more of it which in turn increase the capital rent, 
especially in transport services and garments. Simultaneously, importing sectors should decrease 
their production as imported products (in particular vegetable and animal agricultural ones) become 
more competitive. 
6.2 Long Term Gains with a Dynamic Modeling 
6.2.1 A Macroeconomic Analysis of the Dynamic Model 
The literature of CGE models has evidenced that static models underestimate the eﬀects of policy 
changes as they do not take into account capital accumulation and productivity gains12. The model is 
simulated on a 20 year horizon. 
A cross comparison of the diﬀerent scenarios that have been simulated shows diﬀerent results in 
Table 5. First, as mentioned before, trade facilitation eﬀects on exports are always higher than trade 
liberalization ones. Second, trade facilitation has a negative eﬀect on agents revenues as wages and 
capital remuneration decrease. Yet, on the long run, as prices decline significantly, total consumption 
increases by 2.6%. On the other hand, on the long run total exports as well as total imports increase 
                                                          
11 The main exporting manufacturing sectors in Egypt are textile and garments (7.5% of total exports) and chemical 
industries (7%). Meanwhile, services sectors export more than manufacturing ones as they represent 69.4% of total 
exports thanks to tourism and Suez canal revenues. 
12 A time element is included to solve the model sequentially: an updating capital stock to simulate investment and 
depreciation and an increasing labor stock to simulate population growth. As mentioned above, these models are 
recursive (or sequential) dynamics. Hence, they optimize in each period the agents behavior but the inter-temporal 
allocation of goods and sources will not be optimal in general.  
Other type of CGEs take into account such an aspect especially inter-temporal dynamic CGEs. 
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by 9.1% and 4.8% respectively. Therefore, trade facilitation yields higher gains on the long run 
especially for total exports. 
Meanwhile, such a liberalization or facilitation is taking place in a unilateral way, i.e. Egypt is 
liberalizing and facilitating unilaterally. Clearly, a country gains more when it liberalizes or 
facilitates its trade simultaneously with its partners. Here, only a unilateral trade liberalization and 
facilitation are simulated. A multinational model would be more appropriate to determine the eﬀect 
of a multilateral trade facilitation that has quite a higher positive eﬀect. 
Moreover, the more ambitions the facilitation process, the higher are the gains generated. In other 
words, the trade facilitation gains are proportional to the level of facilitation, i.e. the highest gains 
are produced when Egypt facilitates its trade to the best practice level, while lower gains are 
generated when trade facilitation is implemented through a 50% decrease in the administrative 
barriers13. 
Finally, taking into account TF cost (increasing public expenditure of transport and communication 
by 30% and public wages by 10%) changes slightly the benefits. This may be a little bit 
controversial, but in fact, it is not for two reasons: first, because TF cost is not a true cost as it 
involves many projects improving infrastructure, increasing wages, etc., hence it is a sort of an 
income redistribution made by the government. This is why welfare increases from 1.7% (without 
cost) to 2% (with the cost of TF) and reaches 2.4% on the long run. In other terms, these costs are 
beneficial for the economy that is why they do not highly reduce the gains coming from TF as shown 
in Table 5.  
Second, as mentioned before, the way I have simulated trade facilitation costs does not take into 
account all of the cost aspects, for instance customs computerization, establishing single windows, 
etc. However, it is quite obvious that even when I model TF costs in a simple way through an 
increase in public expenditure of the transport sector and in public wages, TF benefits are reduced, 
especially for exports (that increase by 4.7% (5.8%) in the short run and by 7% (9.1%) in the long 
run when the cost is taken into account (without cost of TF)). But how can such projects be 
financed? Actually, as will be shown later, unlike trade liberalization, government receipts coming 
from imports tariﬀs should not decrease. Moreover, as TF increases imports, tariﬀs revenues will 
increase which boosts government’s receipts and hence enables it to fund new TF projects. Table 5 
shows that TL reduces government revenues by 11% in the short run and by 10% on the long run. 
By contrast, TF raises them by 0.04% in the short run and decreases them by 0.19% in the long run. 
On the other hand, a second important remark that has been mentioned above is related to the 
dynamic impact of trade facilitation vs. trade liberalization. Figure 7 show some selected results for 
the most important exporting sectors in Egypt. It is quite clear that exports increase more when trade 
becomes easier and more simplified than when it is liberalized. When days to exports are eliminated, 
export prices should rise. Simultaneously, imports (Figure 6) increase also for two reasons. First, 
thanks to the reduction of imports time, import prices should decrease, which in turn stimulates 
imports. From a modeling standpoint, the macroeconomic closure of the model encompasses a 
constant share of current account in the GDP, therefore an increase in exports should be 
accompanied by an increase in imports. Therefore, improved terms of trade boosts the gains coming 
from trade facilitation and explains significantly the welfare increase. 
6.2.2 Government and Households: Major Winners 
It turns out that consumption prices decrease as import prices and domestic prices decline when red 
tape costs are eliminated. Less prices mean more consumption for both rural and urban households 
as shown in Table 5. Therefore, even in its dynamic version, the simulation results show that the 
                                                          
13 For the sake of simplicity, the results of this simulation are not here but they are available upon request. In summary, 
all gains are reduced when Egypt reduces its administrative barriers by 50% 
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welfare eﬀects for both rural and urban households are quite high in the trade facilitation scenario 
(1.67% in the short run and 2.26% in the long run) thanks to decreasing prices as the consumer price 
index is cut by 3% in the long run. 
Some observations regarding the agents revenues worth to be mentioned. First, house¬holds real 
income increase in the long run by 2.6% thanks to less prices boosting their purchasing power. In 
addition, as mentioned above, the government revenues decrease less in trade facilitation then in 
trade liberalization as it would not lose the receipts coming from import duties. This in turn will not 
reduce public revenues and the government should be able to fund new projects improving 
infrastructure and to increase the customs agents wages. That is why, in the simulation incorporating 
trade facilitation and its cost, the transport services sector expands significantly (its exports increase 
from 3.7% in the short run to 9.3% in the long run) as its output is used in the trade facilitation 
projects. 
To put it in a nutshell, it is quite clear that the trade facilitation process is very beneficial on the 
internal as well as external level. Those benefits are higher in the long run than in the short run, 
especially for exports, households and government revenues. Moreover, all projects that should be 
put in place to facilitate trade (i.e. improving transport infrastructure and communication, higher 
wages for customs agents) should also improve the eﬃciency and the productivity of the whole 
economy. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper develops a dynamic computable general equilibrium model incorporating trade 
facilitation aspects in Egypt. This paper’s contributions are twofold: theoretical and empirical ones. 
First, this paper uses ad valorem tariﬀ equivalents for barriers associated with trade facilitation 
aspects estimated from a gravity model (Zaki, 2009) taking into account bureaucracy, the Internet 
widespread, corruption and geographical impediments to trade. Such AVE are then introduced in a 
CGE model. Thus, the second contribution of the paper is the direct modeling of such barriers in a 
dynamic CGE model applied on the Egyptian economy. I modify the Exter model in order to take 
into account trade facilitation facets in an explicit way. The model is calibrated on the Egyptian 
social accounting matrix of 2000/2001. My main findings show that, when trade facilitation is 
simulated precisely, i.e. by taking into account its cost as well as the tariﬀ equivalents of its aspects, 
the impact of such a process is reduced with respect to the way it has been modeled in the empirical 
literature. Meanwhile, its impact remains higher than trade liberalization for exports. Moreover, 
some sectors witness a significant expansion more than others, especially food, garments, textiles, 
high value added products and transport services. 
From a policy implication point of view, my analysis sheds the light on some crucial aspects of trade 
policy for developing countries. First, recall that, literally, barriers associated to trade facilitation are 
a deadweight loss, hence all agents should gain from such a process. Yet, taking into account the 
corruption aspects, the welfare of customs agents should be reduced as they will lose revenues 
coming from bribes. That is why the government should increase public servants wages to reduce 
incentives of receiving such bribes in order to speed up import and export procedures. In addition, 
the government should also computerize all customs agencies to reduce such corruption and avoid 
errors in handling exchanged goods. Although TF costs are relatively high, they are not very costly 
as all the projects put in place to facilitate trade (i.e. improving transport infrastructure and 
communication) promote the eﬃciency and the productivity of the whole economy. Recall that trade 
facilitation is necessary to boost trade but not suﬃcient: more performing infrastructure and 
computerized customs authorities are important to guarantee an eﬃcient process of trade facilitation. 
Finally, such a process is diﬀerent from trade liberalization as there are no concessions between 
negotiating countries. In other words, it is a positive sum game for all the economies. 
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From an empirical standpoint, the main shortcomings of this study are threefold. First, Egypt’s main 
trade partners should be taken into account, i.e. the rest of the world should be divided into many 
countries, such as the United States of America, the European Union and the Arab countries. This 
disaggregation should be useful to assess the trade diversion and trade creation eﬀects coming from 
trade facilitation. Moreover, the gravity model should be applied on data taking into account the 
agricultural as well as the services sectors to obtain consistent tariﬀ equivalents of administrative 
barriers for these sectors. Finally, it would be also of interest to calculate the cost of trade facilitation 
in a more precise way taking into account diﬀerent types of costs. These aspects are on my research 
agenda. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 1: Evolution of Document and Time for Export and Import in Egypt 
 
Source: Doing Business, 2009, The World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Ranking of Trade across Borders in Egypt and Some Comparator Countries 
 
Source: Doing Business, 2009, The World Bank. 
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Table 1: Export and Import Procedures in Egypt, 2007 
                                                                                Import Procedures Export Procedures 
Duration (days) US$ Cost  Duration (days)  US$ Cost  
Documents preparation  19  104  13  104  
Inland transportation and handling  2  750  3  850  
Customs clearance and technical control  2  10  1  10  
Ports and terminal handling  2  185  3  50  
Totals:  25  1.049  20  1.014  
Source: “Doing Business”, the World Bank, 2007. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Types of Requested Documents for Exports and Imports in Egypt, 2007 
Import documents Export documents 
Bill of lading Bill of lading
Certificate of origin Certificate of origin 
Commercial invoice Commercial invoice 
Customs import declaration form Customs export declaration form 
Packing list Packing list 
Inspection report Technical standard/health certificate 
Cargo manifest Pre-shipment inspection clean report of findings 
Ship arrival notice/Terminal charges receipt Shipping note 
Source: “Doing Business", the World Bank, 2007. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Egypt's Position vis-`a-vis Other Countries 
 Doc. for exp. Time to exp. Cost to exp. Doc. for imp. Time to imp Cost to imp. 
Best Practice Economies       
Denmark  5     
France 2 2  
Malaysia   450    
Singapore     3 439 
Comparator economies       
Israel 5 12 665 4 12 605 
Jordan 7 19 730 7 22 1290 
Lebanon 5 27 872 7 38 1073 
Syria 8 15 1190 9 21 1625 
Turkey 7 14 940 8 15 1063 
UAE 5 10 618 7 10 587 
Selected economy       
Egypt 6 14 737 6 15 823 
Source: Doing Business, 2009, The World Bank. 
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Results 
Figure 3: Sectoral Exports and Imports 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 4: Estimated Ad valorem Tariﬀ Equivalents for Trade Facilitation Barriers  
 AVE of Time to Exp. AVE of Time to Imp. 
Food  3.37  6.49 
Beverage  8.43  11.56 
Tobacco  2.08  0.00 
Textiles  4.28  8.47 
Wearing Apparel  0.01  14.10 
Leather  0.56  1.83 
Footwear  0.00  11.86 
Wood product except furniture  0.00 1.14
Furniture except metal  0.01  14.21 
Paper  11.29  10.64 
Printing  8.91 20.09
Industrial Chemicals  4.16  6.04 
Chemicals  21.02  17.68 
Petroleum refineries  0.59 0.95
Misc. Petro./ coal  3.68  6.04 
Rubber  11.32  33.74 
Plastic  12.21 15.51
Iron and Steel  2.39  3.69 
Non Ferrous Metals  8.55  27.02 
Fabricated Metal Products  5.37 8.23
Machinery expect electric  20.34  0.01 
Machinery electric  13.36  9.62 
Transport equipment  3.73 6.78
Prof and Scientific equi  19.70  7.13 
Other Industries  12.69  11.28 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table 5: Key Macroeconomic Results 
 Trade Liberalization 
 t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Total Exports  1.36 2.09 2.92% 3.56% 4.08% 
Total Imports 10.91% 11.20% 11.46% 11.53% 11.56% 
Total Investment -0.71% -0.80% -0.90% -0.93% -0.94% 
Total Consumption 2.74%  2.88% 3.02% 3.05% 3.11% 
Wages  -0.60% -0.81% -0.94% -1.02% -1.18% 
Capital Rem  -2.32% -2.06% -1.84% -1.72% -1.71% 
HH Real Rev.  2.71% 2.85% 2.99% 3.03% 3.09% 
Firms Rev.  -0.61% -0.66% -0.72% -0.70% -0.68% 
Gov. Rev  -11.06% -11.71% -12.17% -11.55% -10.46% 
CPI  -2.79% -2.98% -3.13% -3.27% -3.27% 
Welfare  2.38 2.35 2.40 2.51 2.62 
 Trade Facilitation 
 t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Total Exports  5.83%  6.87% 7.92% 8.55% 9.11% 
Total Imports 4.99%  4.86% 4.75% 4.81% 4.82% 
Total Investment -0.49%  -0.72% -0.97% -1.04% -1.11% 
Total Consumption 1.89%  2.12% 2.36% 2.48% 2.59% 
Wages  -0.70%  -1.02% -1.32% -1.49% -1.63% 
Capital Rem  -1.94%  -1.94% -2.01% -1.94% -2.01% 
HH Real Rev.  1.94%  2.15% 2.37% 2.50% 2.62% 
Firms Rev.  -0.30%  -0.47% -0.66% -0.69% -0.71% 
Gov. Rev  0.04%  -0.05% -0.16% -0.18% -0.19% 
CPI  -2.06%  -2.38% -2.69% -2.87% -3.00% 
Welfare  1.67  1.75 1.92 2.09 2.26 
 Trade Facilitation + Cost 
 t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Total Exports  4.74%  5.44% 5.63% 6.36% 7.03% 
Total Imports 6.07%  6.27% 7.06% 7.07% 7.01% 
Total Investment 0.15%  0.13% 0.41% 0.32% 0.22% 
Total Consumption 2.33%  2.71% 3.33% 3.46% 3.56% 
Wages  -0.10%  -0.20% 0.09% -0.19% -0.36% 
Capital Rem  -1.34%  -1.21% -0.82% -0.84% -0.97% 
HH Real Rev.  2.38%  2.74% 3.35% 3.48% 3.59% 
Firms Rev.  0.27%  0.28% 0.56% 0.50% 0.44% 
Gov. Rev  0.70%  0.82% 1.27% 1.16% 0.99% 
CPI  -1.52%  -1.74% -1.68% -1.93% -2.09% 
Welfare  2.03  2.17 2.35 2.39 2.43 
Note: Figures shown here are percentage change with respect to the BAU scenario. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table 6: Selected Sectoral Results: Imports and Imports Prices 
  Trade Liberalization 
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Imports AGRANM 24.25% 24.09% 24.13% 24.29%  24.36% 
 AGRVEG 15.65%  16.01%  16.38%  16.75%  16.95%  
 INDENG 5.20%  5.29%  5.32%  5.32%  5.32%  
 INDFOOD 21.80% 21.75% 21.87% 22.08%  22.20% 
 INDNMET 11.56%  11.80%  11.83%  11.80%  11.73% - 
Import Prices AGRANM -12.82% -12.82% -12.82% -12.82% 12.82% - 
 AGRVEG  -10.10%  -10.10%  -10.10%   -10.10%  10.10% - 
 INDENG  -5.18% -  -5.18% - -5.18% - -5.18% - 5.18% - 
 INDFOOD 12.55% - 12.55% - 12.55% - 12.55% - 12.55% - 
 INDNMET 7.04%  7.04%  7.04%  7.04%  7.04%  
  Trade Facilitation 
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Imports AGRANM 8.77%  8.68%  8.61%  8.62%  8.57%  
 AGRVEG 6.59% 6.95% 7.26% 7.56%  7.69% 
 INDENG 0.71%  0.52%  0.37%  0.44%  0.49%  
 INDFOOD 7.35%  7.32%  7.35%  7.45%  7.48%  
 INDNMET 22.08% - 23.71% 25.08% - 26.34% - 26.98% -
Import Prices AGRANM 6.37% - -6.37% - 6.37% - 6.37% - 6.37% - 
 AGRVEG 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 
 INDENG 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 
 INDFOOD 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 
 INDNMET 17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  
  Trade Facilitation + Cost 
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Imports AGRANM 10.44%  10.73%  11.82%  11.65%  11.44%  
 AGRVEG 8.00%  8.74%  10.13%  10.37%  10.39%  
 INDENG 1.42%  1.47%  1.94%  2.01%  2.03%  
 INDFOOD 8.78%  9.11%  10.20%  10.19%  10.10%  
 INDNMET 23.19% - 25.20%  27.60%  28.88% - 29.48% - 
Import Prices AGRANM 6.37% - -6.37% - -6.37% - 6.37% - 6.37% - 
 AGRVEG 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 6.60% - 
 INDENG 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 4.55% - 
 INDFOOD 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 6.39% - 
 INDNMET 17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  17.63%  
Note: Figures shown here are percentage change with respect to the BAU scenario. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table 7: Selected Sectoral Results: Exports and Export Prices 
  Trade Liberalization 
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Exports INDCHM  2.15% 2.56% 3.11% 3.56% 3.96%
 INDENG  3.63% 3.59% 3.73% 3.91% 4.12% 
 INDFOOD  5.82% 5.68% 5.62% 5.56% 5.61% 
 INDSPIN  3.06% 3.38% 3.82% 4.14% 4.44%
 SERTRA  0.31% 1.25% 2.36% 3.19% 3.84% 
Export Prices INDCHM  -0.70% -0.86% -0.95% -1.07% -1.29% 
 INDENG  -1.20% -1.16% -1.24% -1.27% -1.30%
 INDFOOD  -1.90% -1.82% -1.80% -1.76% -1.80% 
 INDSPIN  -1.00% -1.05% -1.23% -1.27% -1.50% 
 SERTRA  -0.10% -0.38% -0.85% -0.97% -1.20% 
  Trade Facilitation
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Exports INDCHM  26.09%  26.54% 27.00%  27.09% 27.27%  
 INDENG  37.33% 37.32% 37.48% 37.44% 37.55% 
 INDFOOD  15.75%   15.82% 16.00%   16.06% 16.24%  
 INDSPIN  10.84%   11.49% 12.18%   12.57% 12.95%  
 SERTRA  5.37% 7.34% 9.27% 10.43% 11.34% 
Export Prices INDCHM  2.90%  2.78%  2.75%   2.72%  2.58%  
 INDENG  4.10%  4.15%  4.11%  4.11%  4.10%  
 INDFOOD  0.30% 0.29% 0.19% 0.20% - 0.10% 
 INDSPIN  0.40%  0.19%  0.00%  -0.10%  -0.30%  
 SERTRA  1.50%  0.95%  0.28%  0.00%  -0.30%  
  Trade Facilitation + Cost
  t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 
Exports INDCHM  24.92%  24.95%  24.36%  24.47% 24.73%  
 INDENG  36.15%  35.71%  34.84% 34.81%  34.97%  
 INDFOOD  14.54%  14.35% 13.74% 13.99%  14.32%  
 INDSPIN  9.71%  10.01% 9.82%  10.31%  10.82%  
 SERTRA  3.70%  5.42%  6.61%  8.10%  9.27%  
Export Prices INDCHM  3.20%  3.16%  3.42%  3.40%  3.28%  
 INDENG  4.40%  4.53%  4.78%  4.79%  4.80%  
 INDFOOD  0.60%  0.67%  0.85%  0.78%  0.60%  
 INDSPIN  0.70%  0.67%  0.66%  0.58%  0.30%  
 SERTRA  2.10%  1.52%  1.13%  0.68%  0.30%  
Note: Figures shown here are percentage change with respect to the BAU scenario. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Appendix 1: Legal Framework of Import and Export Procedures in Egypt 
This appendix is split from the Trade Policy Review (WTO, 2005) which displays the legal 
framework of import and export procedures in Egypt. For the sake of clarity, it is divided in three 
parts: first, laws regulating such procedures are displayed; second, the concerned parties are 
mentioned and finally, the characteristics of some goods are exhibited in a third stance. 
Which laws? Egypt’s customs regime is based on Law 121/1982, Law 66/1963 (the Customs Law), 
Law 118/1975 (which, together with its Executive Regulations (Ministerial Decree 275/1991), is 
also known as the Import and Export Regulations), and a number of Ministerial Decrees. 
Who is concerned? In accordance with Law 121/1982, all persons or companies importing goods 
into Egypt must register with the General Organization for Export and Import Control within the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry. The Law also requires that all registered importers be 
Egyptian nationals and fulfil a number of other conditions, including financial reliability and the 
presentation of a proven record of past commercial activities. When registering, importers must also 
provide details of the products they intend to import. Importers must pay for imports through a bank 
operating in Egypt. 
Which goods? All goods imported into Egypt, except those destined for the free zones, must be 
accompanied by a customs declaration, irrespective of their value. Other documents required are the 
original commercial invoice, bill of lading, packing list, pro-forma invoice, a form specifying the 
mode of payment, delivery order from the carrier in return for the bill of lading, and, if appropriate, a 
content analysis of the commodity. In certain cases, additional certificates may be required by the 
customs authorities, including chemical certificates for imports of food additives and other material 
used in the food processing industry; quality control certificates for a number of products; and a 
disinfection certificate for shipments of shaving brushes and bristles. Sanitary certificates are also 
required for a number of products, and plant and animal products are subject to inspection by the 
Agriculture Quarantine Body and the Animal Quarantine Body. Ministerial Decree 619/1998 
requires that all imported consumer goods be shipped directly from the country of origin to Egypt. 
Ministerial Decree 423/1999 exempts from these provisions goods shipped from the producing 
country through a transit port and goods assembled from intermediate products of diﬀerent origins. 
The authorities indicate that the decrees are intended to prevent the entry of products of unknown 
source into the Egyptian market. Various imported goods are liable to quality control inspection by 
the General Organization for Export and Import Control within one week of the date of import. The 
Organization is entitled to examine a random sample of 1% of the total number of packages in each 
consignment and up to 2% of the contents of the chosen packages. The procedures for sampling are 
laid down in Ministerial Decree 1186/2003; as a main principle, the customs oﬃcials must ensure 
that the samples examined are representative for the consignment. If the chosen samples are not in 
conformity with regulations, the Organization may search up to 2% of the remaining number of 
packages in the sample before rejecting a consignment. Rejected goods must be re-exported or 
destroyed. 
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Appendix 2: A Descriptive Analysis of the Egyptian Economy 
This sections analyzes the main features of the Egyptian economy through the SAM flows. It focuses 
on five main aspects: the agents revenues and the expenditures, the economic activities, the structure 
of the final demand, relations with the rest of the world and the capital market. 
2.1. Revenues and Expenditures of Economic Agents 
Regarding the households account, dividends from private companies constitute the major source of 
household income (representing 56.8% and 52.8% of the total income of urban and rural households 
respectively). The second source of income is wages (on average 37% of their income). These wages 
are those levied by national workers, to which transfers from Egyptian workers abroad are added and 
from which those of foreign workers in Egypt are subtracted. On the other hand, consumption 
represents 84% of the households income. These figures show an important fact: having a huge 
consumption, Egyptian population are characterized by low savings (12% of their income), which in 
turn weakens the investment potential. 
Concerning private firms, on the one hand, capital income constitutes the largest source of their 
revenue (88.6%). On the other, 14.1% of their revenues are intended to savings and 76.1% 
distributed as dividends to households. For this, the bulk of household income comes from dividends 
paid by companies in the form of interest and distributed profits. 
The government’s income is composed mainly of direct taxes (L.E. 38040, or 57% of the total 
revenue) with 66% coming from direct taxes imposed on private firms. Secondly, indirect taxes 
represent 25.5% of government revenue. Among the most taxed sectors, productive services one is 
ranked first14. Its contribution is equal to 63.5% of revenues coming from indirect taxes. By contrast, 
the most subsidized sector is the social services one, with a share of indirect taxes net of subsidies -
16.7%. Revenues from import tariﬀs and sales taxes represent the third largest source of government 
revenue: three sectors are not subject to such taxes (services sectors). However, the biggest 
contributor to revenue of tariﬀs is the chemical industries sector (24.64%), which is one of the 
biggest importers in Egypt, after the equipment and machinery sector and the crop production one. 
The government expenditures are structured as follows: 55% of the revenues are allocated to 
transfers of households (pensions, insurance and other current transfers) and businesses (the 
domestic debt interest paid to public companies and other current transfers to the private ones) and 
42% for the salaries of public servants. This high percentage of the wage bill is explained by the 
magnitude of public employment in Egypt, characterized by high stability. Finally, the government 
is still in deficit, explaining why its savings are negative. 
2.2. Economic Activities 
 The contribution of each sector in total output and value-added: The total contribution of the 
three services sectors either in total production or in the value added is very high (45 % and 50% 
respectively of which 27% and 28% are due to productive services sector). Thanks to tourism 
and the Suez Canal, Egypt is characterized by a dominant services sector. 
 The demand of production factors: The government is the largest employer of labor (21.2% of 
total labor). The second employer is the crop production sector followed by the productive 
services one. This sector also uses a lot of capital, since its demand represents 33.8% of the total 
capital. 
 Interactions between economic activities: The input/output table in the SAM shows that 19% of 
the table cells are zeros, pointing out relatively weak interactions between economic activities. 
However, upstream and downstream linkages are relatively high between certain sectors. 
                                                          
14 14The services sector is a very important contributor to the Egyptian growth as its contribution varies between 45% 
and 50% of the GDP. The remaining of the growth is divided between agriculture (10%) and industries (40%) 
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Obviously, the tobacco sector is not among the sectors with high interactions since its production 
is not used by other industries, and its intermediate demand is also low. Notwithstanding, the 
services one in general and in particular the other productive services one figure among the 
sectors with high upstream and downstream linkages. In fact, several sectors uses its output as 
input for their production as the productive services sector includes electricity, tourism, finance, 
insurance and construction. This sector figures as an intermediate good in all other sectors: on 
average, the top ten sectors that consume its output attribute 28.3% of their expenditures to it. 
Similarly, the demand coming from this sector to the others is also high, especially addressed to 
itself (24% of its intermediate demand), to non-metal industries (16.6%) and basic metals 
industries(15%). These percentages represent significant shares of these sectors revenues: 88% of 
non-metal industries revenues, 68.5% of transport and communication revenues and 47.6 % of 
basic metals revenues. 
2.3. The Final Demand  
On the one hand, consumption of urban households is focused primarily on productive services 
(15.7%) as electricity, insurance and finance, as well as transportation and communication are 
essential elements of life in the city. On the other hand, consumption of rural households is focused 
on crop production goods (13%): these households living in the countryside, self-consume their 
production. The food industry ranks second for both types of households (on average 11% of total 
consumption for each type of household). 
The government allocates almost half of its consumption expenditure (47%) to pro¬ductive services. 
This sector includes services that are used in all public institutions such as electricity. 
2.4. The Rest of the World 
The presence of a “Rest of the World” (RoW) gives birth to several flows, on the one hand, with the 
economic activities and on the other hand with the economic agents. First, relations between 
economic activities and the RoW are represented by trade exports and imports. The structure of trade 
is as follows: for exports, those of productive services (transport, communication and other 
productive services) are ranked first, with a share of 70% (because they include tourism and Suez 
Canal revenues), followed by chemical industries (7%) and finally those of spinning and weaving 
and garments (3.5% and 4% respectively). Yet, the structure of imports is a bit diﬀerent, because the 
import of equipment and machinery occupies the first position (21.8%), followed by chemical 
industries (12.5%) and crop production (12%, particularly wheat) as Egypt is a net importer of food 
and agricultural crops. 
Second, relations between the rest of the world and the economic agents are represented by the 
transfers between the two sides. The transfers from the rest of the world to the national agents 
represent 3% of the urban households income, 3% of the rural one, 3.7% of government revenues 
and 2.7% of the firms earnings. The government transfers to the rest of the world represent 4.4% of 
government expenditures. 
2.5. The Capital Account 
The major contributor in aggregate savings is firms (their share in the total savings is 55.5%), 
followed by urban households (37.5%), who certainly save more than rural ones (27.5%). 
Admittedly, the government being in deficit, public savings are negative, with a share of -20% to 
total savings. The foreign savings (which is equal to the current account deficit) is low, amounting to 
L.E. 98 million (0.14% of total savings). Regarding the investment demand, the other productive 
services sector occupies the first position with a share of 61% of the total demand for investment, 
followed by equipment and machinery one (17.6%). 
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Appendix 3: List of sectors 
The Egyptian SAM includes 17 sectors. For the sake of modeling, two service sectors have been 
merged in order to avoid zero values present in the SAM. Those sectors are distributed as follows: 2 
agricultural sectors, 11 industrial ones and 3 services sectors as follows: 
Table 8: List of sectors included in the SAM 
Abbreviation  Sector  
AGRVEG  Agriculture vegetal production  
AGRANM  Agriculture animal production  
INDOIL  Oil and extraction industry  
INDFOOD  Food industry  
INDTOB  Tobacco industry  
INDSPIN  Spinning and weaving industry  
INDCLO  Clothes(includes leather)  
INDCHM  Chemical industries  
INDNMET  Non-metal industries  
INDBAS  Basic metal industries  
INDMET  Metal industries  
INDENG  Enginery and machinery industries  
INDOTH  Other industries  
SERTRA  Transport and communication services  
SEROTH  Other services  
SOCSER  Social services  
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Appendix 4: The Model Structure 
Figure 4: Structure of the Model 
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Appendix 5: The Model Notation 
Definition of Diﬀerent Sets 
h  Household of type h  
I  and  j Sectors of the economy (16 sectors)  
t Time index  
 
Parameters Definition 
1. Production Functions 
νj Share of the value added in the production (Leontief) of sector j 
ioj Share of intermediary consumption in the production (Leontief) of sector j 
aijij Intermediary consumption of good i by unity of production of sector j 
δj Share of sector j value added of in GDP at factor cost 
 
2. CES Function Between Capital and Labor 
 
Aj         Scale parameter of the value added CES function of sector j 
αj         Share parameter of the value added CES function of sector j 
ρj         Substitution elasticity between labor and capital 
σj         Substitution parameter (value added function) 
 
3. Demand Functions 
φh Household h propensity to save
γih Budgetary share of good i in the income of household h 
µi Share of investment demand of sector i in total investment 
λ HW  Share of Household h in the wages bill 
C min,hi  Minimal consumption of good i by household h 
 
4. Tax Rates 
txj Indirect taxes rate applied on sector j products 
tmj Import tariﬀ rate applied on sector j products 
tej Export tariﬀ rate applied on sector j products 
tpj Production tax rate applied on sector j 
tyhh Direct tax rate applied on household h income 
t y f   Direct tax rate applied on firms income 
va 
va 
va 
va 
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5. CES Function Between Imports and Domestic Production  
A mj  Scale parameter of the Armington CES function 
α mj  Share parameter of the Armington CES function 
ρ mj  Substitution parameter 
σ mj  Substitution elasticity (Armington function) 
 
6. CET Function Between Exports and Domestic Production 
B ej  Scale parameter of the CET production function 
β ej  Share parameter of the CET production function 
τ ej  Transformation elasticity (CET production function) 
ε ej  Price elasticity 
κ ej  Transformation parameter 
EXD oj  Scale parameter of exports 
 
7. Trade Facilitation 
t f mj Tariﬀ equivalent of time to import for sector j products 
t f xj Tariﬀ equivalent of time to exports of sector j products 
γi,inef Budgetary share of good i in the ineﬃciency agent income 
 
8. Growth Rates  
gnt Population growth rate  
tfpt Total factor productivity growth rate 
ggt Public consumption growth rate  
gptt Growth rate of private transfer coming from RoW 
ggtt Growth rate of public transfer coming from RoW 
wggt Public wages growth rate 
ldgt Public employment growth rate 
 
9. Other Parameters 
ir Real interest rate  
δ Capital depreciation rate 
γ1i Parameter 1 of the investment demand equation 
γ2i Parameter 2 of the investment demand equation 
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Variables Definition 
A-Endogenous variables 
1. Production  
VAj,t Value added of sector j 
X Sj,t Production of sector j 
X X Sj,t Production of sector j at basic prices 
C Ij,t Total intermediary consumption of sector j 
D Ii,j,t Intermediary demand of product i by sector j 
 
2. Production Factors 
L Dj,t Labor demand by sector j 
K Dj,t Capital demand by sector j 
L St Labor supply 
 
3. Prices 
wt Average wage 
rj,t Capital return in sector j 
P vj,t Value added price of sector j 
P cij,t Intermediate consumption of sector j 
Pcj,t Market price of the composite good belonging to sector j 
Pj,t Production price on factor cost of sector j 
P lj,t Producer price of sector j product sold on the domestic market 
P fobj,t Fob price of the exported good j 
P mj,t Domestic price of the imported good j 
Pej,t Producer price of the exported good j 
P invj,t Investment price index 
P C Ih,t Consumer price index for household h 
Ut Capital user cost 
Pindext GDP deflator 
 
4. Revenues and Savings 
Y Hh,t Household h income 
Y D Hh,t Disposable income of household h 
Y Ft Firms income 
Y Gt Government income 
S Hh,t Household h savings 
S Ft Firms savings 
S Gt Government savings 
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5. Tax Revenues 
T D Hh,t Receipts from direct taxes of household h 
T D Ft Receipts from direct taxes of firms 
T Ij,t Receipts from indirect of sector j 
T I Mj,t Receipts from import tariﬀs of goods j 
T I Ej,t Receipts from export tariﬀs of goods j 
T I Pj,t Receipts from production taxes 
 
6. External Trade 
E Xj,t Export supply of product j 
E X Dj,t Export demand of product j 
Mj,t Import demand of product j 
Dj,t Domestic production of sector j sold on the domestic market 
Qj,t Supply of composite product belonging to sector j 
C A Bt Current account balance (external savings) 
 
7. Final Demand 
Ci,h,t  Consumption of good i by household h  
I N Vi,t  Investment demand of product i  
D I Ti,t  Total intermediary demand of input i  
I Tt  Gross fixed capital formation  
ITVOLt  Volume of total investment  
I N Di,t  Investment by destination  
E Vh,t  Equivalent variation of household h  
 
8. Trade Facilitation 
T F Mj,t Import time revenues on imported goods j 
T F Xj,t Export documents revenues on exported goods j 
Ci,inef,t Consumption of good i of the ineﬃciency agent 
Y Hinef,t Income of the ineﬃciency agent 
 
9. Other variables 
G D P tBP GDP at basic prices 
G D P tF D GDP at purchasers prices from the perspective of final demand 
G D P tIB GDP at market price (income based) 
G D P tMP GDP at market prices 
savadjt Adjustment variable for investment and savings 
Leonj Walras law verification variable 
C LO1 First closure (fixed share of current account to GDP) 
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B. Exogenous variables 
P wmj,t International import price of product j (foreign currency) 
P wej,t International export price of product j (foreign currency) 
et Exchange rate, numeraire 
Gi,t0 Public consumption of product i 
LDGt0 Labor demand by public sector 
wGt0 Wage rate in public sector TRf,h,t0 Dividends distributed by firms to household h 
TRf,h,t0 Dividends distributed by firms to household h 
TRh,f,t0 Transfers from household h to the firms 
TRROW,h,t0 Transfers from the Rest of the World to household h 
TRROW,f,t0 Transfers from the Rest of the World to the firms 
TRROW,G,t0 Transfers from the Rest of the World to the government 
TRG,h,t0 Transfers made by the government to household h 
TRG,f,t0 Transfers from the government to the firms 
TRG,ROW,t0 Transfers from the government to the Rest of the World 
 
 
The Model Equations 
 
1-Production Bloc 
XSj,t  = )][(min 
j
tj,
j
tj,
v
VA
)(
io
CI
 (A1)
XXSj,t = XSj,t . tpj (A2)
VAj,t = A vaj  [α vaj
va
jρ
jt
−LD + (1– α vaj ) 
va
jρ
jt
−KD ] vajρ
1−
 
(A3)
CIj,t = ioj X Sj,t (A4)
DIij,t = aijijCIj,t (A5)
LDj,t = ( va
j
va
j
α
α
−1 )
va
jσ (
t
tj
w
r , )
va
jσ  KDj,t (A6)
 
2. Revenues and Savings Bloc 
Y Hh,t = hwλ  ∑=
16
1j
L Dj,t .w + T RG,h,t  + T Rf,h,t  + T RROW,h,t + hwλ . LGG,t (A7)
Y D Hh,t = Y Hh,t – T Dh,t – T Rh,f,t 
(A8)
Y Ft = ∑=
16
1j
rj,t K Dj,t + T RROW,f,t  + ∑
=
hr
huh
T Rh,f,t + T RG,f,t 
(A9)
S Hh,t = φh Y D Hh,t 
(A10)
S Ft = Y Ft – ∑
=
hr
huh
T Rf,h,t  – T D Ft (A11)
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3. Government Revenues and Savings 
TIPj,t  = tpj Pj,t X Sj,t (A12)
TIi,t  = txi(Pli,t Di,t) + txi (1 + tmi + tti) et P wmi,tMi,t (A13)
TIMi,t = tmi P wmi,t et Mi,t (A14)
TIEi,t  =  tei P ei,t EXi,t (A15)
T D Hh,t = tyhh Y Hh,t (A16)
T D Ft = tyf Y Ft (A17)
Y Gt = ∑=
16
1j
T I Mi,t  + ∑
i
 T I Ei,t + ∑
i
TIi,t + ∑=
hr
huh
T D Hh,t + T D Ft + TRROW,G,t (A18)
SGt = YGt − ∑=
16
1j
Gi,t − ∑=
hr
huh
TRG,h,t − TRG,f,t – w L DG,t − TRG,ROW,t (A19)
 
4. Final Demand Bloc 
PCi,t Ci,h,t = PCi,t  C
min
,hi  + γih (Y D Hh,t  −∑
i
 P Ci,t  C
min
,hi )  (A20) 
(A21)
INVi,t = 
ti,PC
tITiμ  (A22)
DITi,t = ∑=
16
1j
D Ii,j,t (A23)
 
 
5. Prices Bloc 
P vj,t  = Pj,t XSj,t −∑=
16
1i
Pci,t  DIi,j,t  
                         VAj,t 
(A24)
Pcij,t = 
tj
j tjitj
CI
DIPC
,
,,,∑  (A25)
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rj,t  =  
tj,
tj,ttj,tj,
KD
LDwVAPv −
 (A26)
Pmi,t  = et Pwmi,t (1+ tmi + t f mi)(1+t xi) (A27)  
Pei,t   = )1( ix f tite
ti,fob P te
++  (A28)
PCi,t   = (1 + txi) (A29)
Pi,t  =  (A30)
Pinvi  = П (          ) μi (A31)
Pindext  = ∑
j
PVj,t  δj 
(A32)
PCI h  =   ∑
i
γhi  PCi (A33)
 
 
6. International Trade Bloc 
XSi,t   = B
e
i [β
e
i  
e
iκ
ti,EX
−
  + (1− β ei  ) 
e
i
tiD
κ−
,  ]
e
iK
1−
 
(A34)
EXi,t   = [(             )(           )]
e
iτ  Di,t (A35)
E X Di,t  = EXD
o
j  (              ) 
e
iε  (A36)
Qi,t   = A
m
i[α mi M
m
i
ti
ρ−
, + ( 1 − α mi ) D
m
i
ti
ρ−
, ]- mip
1
 (A37)
 Pli,t Di,t + Pmi,t  Mi,t 
Qi,t 
Pli,t Di,t + Pei,t E Xi,t 
X Si,t 
PCi,t 
μi 
1− β ei  
   β ei  
Pei,t 
Pli,t 
Pwei,t 
P fobi,t 
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Mi,t   =  [(              ) (             )]
m
jσ
Di,t (A38)
CABt  = e∑
i
 Pwmi,t Mi,t + TRG,ROW,t  − TRROW,h,t  − TRROW,G,t  − TRROW,f,t   
          − et∑
i
 Pfobi,t  EXi,t 
(A39)
 
 
7. Trade Facilitation 
TFMi,t    =  t f mi Pwmi,t,e t  Mi,t (A40)
TFXi,t      = t f xi Pei,t  E Xi,t (A41)
YHinef,t    = ∑=
16
1i
TFMj,t (A42)
Ci,inef,t  =  γi,inef Y Hinef,t  / Pci,t (A43)
 
 
8. Equilibrium Equations Bloc 
LSt  =  ∑=
16
1i
LDj,t  + LDG,t (A44)
Qi,t  = DITi,t + ∑=
hr
huh
Ci,h,t  + I N Vi,t  + Gi,t (A45)
ITt  = ∑=
hr
huh
S Hh,t  + S Ft  + SGt + CABt + ∑=
16
1i
T F Xi,t (A46)
ITt  = Pinv te .∑  Indi,t (A47)
    α
m
i  
1−α mi  
Pdi,t 
Pmi,t 
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E X Di,t  = E Xi,t (A48)
EVh,t  = (
i
Π  (PCOi  / PCi,t) hi,γ Y Hh,t) – Y H Oh (A49)
GDP Bpt  = ∑
j
 P vj,t V Aj,t + ∑
j
 T I Pj,t (A50)
GDP Mpt  = GDP
Bp
t  + ∑
i
 T I Mi,t  + ∑
i
 T Ii,t (A51)
GDP FDt  = ∑
i
 [PCi,t  ( ∑
h
Ci,h,t  + Gi,t + INVi,t)] + ∑
j
P fobi,t  E X Di,t 
              – ∑
i
 Pwmi,t  Mi,t et (A52)
GDP IBt   = ∑
j
wt L Dj,t + ∑
j
 rj,t K Dj,t  + ∑
j
TIMi,t  + ∑
j
TIi,t + ∑
j
TIPj,t (A53)
 
 
9-Closure 
CLO2  =   (A54)
 
 
10. Dynamic Bloc 
                =  [γ1i (        ) 2   +   γ2i (         )] savadjt (A55) 
ITVOLt  =   (A56) 
KDi,t+1   =  ( 1 – δ ) KDi,t  + Indi,t (A57) 
LSt  + 1  =  ( 1 + gnt) . LSt  (A58) 
Ut  = Pinvt ( ir + δ ) (A59) 
CABt 
GDPt 
Indi,t 
KDi,t 
ri,t 
Ut 
ri,t  
Ut 
  I Tt 
Pinvt 
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Gi,t +1  =  ( 1 + ggt) . Gi,t  (A60) 
C  min       1,, +thhi  =  (1 + gnt ) . C
min     
,, thhi   (A61) 
A
va
tj 1, +   =  ( 1 + t f pt )  . A
va
tj,  (A62) 
TRh,f,t+1    =  (1 + gnt ) . TRh,f,t (A63) 
TRf,h,t+1    =  (1 + gnt ) . TRf,h,t (A64) 
TRROW,h,t+1  =   (1 + gptt ) . TRROW,h,t (A65) 
TRROW,f,t+1  =   (1 + gptt ) . TRROW,f,t (A66) 
TRROW,G,t+1  =   (1 + ggtt ) . TRROW,G,t (A67) 
TRG,f,t+1    =  (1 + gnt ) * TRG,f,t (A68) 
TRG,h,t+1    =  (1 + gnt ) * TRG,h,t (A69) 
TRG,ROW,t+1  =   (1 + ggtt ) . TRG,ROW,t (A70) 
w
G  
t 1+   = (1 + wggt ) . w
G
t   (A71) 
LD
G  
t 1+   = (1 + ldgt ) . LD
G
t   (A72) 
 
